WATERLOO / MONS / LE CATEAU — Wilfred Owen’s death and grave

DEFENSIVE, ONE-DAY BATTLES FEATURING BRITISH ARMS

WATERLOO

‘A damned nice thing…’ The climax of The Waterloo Campaign and the Napoleonic Wars, this bloody but decisive battle – fought in a shallow, muddy valley near Brussels – secured peace in Europe for 50 years. This was the only time Wellington and Napoleon faced each other (although Marshall Ney fought — or misfought — the tactical battle).

Napoleon, having escaped from Elba, was determined to conquer Belgium and Holland to rebuild his empire. His strategy was to defeat the Allies separately before forcing an armistice favourable to France. Thus when he learnt that the Anglo/Dutch Belgians and the Prussians had retreated on divergent lines, following their mauling at Quatre Bras and Ligny respectively (16 June) — Wellington N to Waterloo and the Prussian Blucher NE to Wavre — he decided to advance first on Wellington, while Marshall Grouchy supposedly held the Prussians to his right (but hoping that Blucher was beaten and would retire on his line of supply). Crucially, however, Wellington received a pledge from Blucher (2 a.m., 18 June) of his support, and although this could not be forthcoming before the evening of the fighting, Wellington resolved to stand and fight.

Mark Hepworth, Rupert Green and Nicky Bird on top of the Lion Monument, 2002

For the battle, Napoleon adopted a blunderbuss strategy, hoping that artillery and frontal attacks would eventually demoralise the Anglo/Dutch into flight – before Blucher could arrive with his 80,000 Prussians from the NE. But Ney depleted his forces with fruitless attacks on unbroken British squares, and the day ended when the resilient Allies halted the Imperial Guard’s final attempt at breaking through, with a sudden rifle volley into their flank. The French were routed. The non-arrival of Marshall Grouchy’s 40,000 French troops, and the appearance of Blucher’s army advancing on Napoleon’s right flank had helped destroy French morale. Europe was free of the scourge of Bonapartism. Allied losses were about 22,000 killed and wounded (7000 of these were Prussian); French losses may have been as high as 37,000.

THE FIELD OF BATTLE – some 2 miles wide – is well preserved and the crucial buildings of La Haie Sainte and Hougoumont, where fighting raged all day, are much as they were. We may also visit the battlefields of Quatre Bras and Ligny, the preliminary battles and Allied defeats (or ‘tactical withdrawals’). At Waterloo there are 5 main viewpoints:

Viewpoint 1 is on the left/centre of Wellington’s line, on the ridge, and is where the first great action took place (2 p.m.) – the attack by French infantry and counter-attack by British heavy cavalry and the Household Brigade, led by the cavalry commander Lord Uxbridge; a cavalry charge that, though successfully repulsing the enemy, could not be recalled and ended across the valley by the French guns, about half the 2500 horsemen being killed or captured.

Viewpoint 2 is the farmhouse of La Haie Sainte in front of Wellington’s centre, defended at great cost all day – until ammunition ran out – by the King’s German Legion. You can still see loopholes and bullet marks in the walls.

Viewpoint 3 is on Wellington’s right, the scene of French cavalry attacks in the afternoon and the final attack of the Imperial Guard.

Waterloo: Hougoumont after the battle; burying the dead

Viewpoint 4 is the farm or small chateau (since destroyed) of Hougoumont, crucial to the defence of Wellington’s line, as its capture would lead to the French outflanking Wellington’s right, through a dip in the ground, unseen from the ridge above. The chateau, where 10,000 men fell, held out. 4000 are buried in a communal grave outside.

Viewpoint 5 is by the old inn of La Belle Alliance, where Napoleon reviewed his 70,000 troops in the morning, where the Imperial Guard made a last fleeting stand, and where Blucher and Wellington met outside the inn after the battle, the Prussians agreeing to pursue the enemy. You will note that Napoleon should have remained here after his review (he returned only at 4.30 to view his cavalry attack), because from the field (steps lead up the bank) you can see what is happening in the valley, which he could not from his vantage point at Rossome, a mile behind.

Waterloo: Hougoumont today; the main, north gate. On the closing of this gate, Wellington said, the whole battle depended

If you look up to the ridge which Wellington defended you will appreciate one of the main reasons for Napoleon’s defeat: his soldiers could not see Wellington’s troops lying down on the reverse slope and assumed with every attack that they were broken. The French attacked in unsuitable formations – unsupported cavalry, or in blocks where only the front three ranks could fire, rather than in line abreast – but could not reform when they discovered their fatal mistake.

MONS

The first British shots of the War…‘Neither a victory nor a defeat , but a delaying action that achieved its purpose…’ Mons, the scene of the BEF’s first battle in The Great War, was a small, Belgian mining town (the mines have since closed, cement is now the local industry). The BEF were there because the Allied plan called for the British to support the extreme left of the French line. Mons, a purely defensive battle, was fought by FM Sir John French, the British Commander, in a salient to the NE of Mons itself, with the main position along the line of the Mons-Conde canal. The Germans did not know the British lay in wait. 30,000 British faced 90,000 Germans.

Three German Armies had violated Belgian neutrality (as part of the Schlieffen Plan) en route to the French border. Originally the Plan had called for a vast sweep through Holland as well as Belgium, the extreme right of the German line ultimately swinging W of Paris. But this added violation was abandoned by von Moltke, Chief of the General Staff, and he compromised the Plan by shortening the arc of advance and turning E of Paris. He considered the Plan too ambitious, even for the German army.

The German 1st Army under von Kluck focused their attack on the bridges at Nimy and Obourg, held by Smith-Dorrien’s II Corps. Massed infantry attacks were made ‘in solid square blocks’ (‘the most perfect targets’) and they were mauled by 4th Royal Fusiliers and 4th Middx. But the weight of attacks, unopposed German artillery fire (British artillery was positioned W of Mons to counter any outflanking movement), and a crossing E of the line at an undefended spot, led first (1300 hrs.) to a British withdrawal to the town; and then (late p.m.), following further German crossings to the W, to a general withdrawal S of Mons.

Here a defensive position was prepared for the anticipated battle next day, but at 2300 it was learnt (through a quick-thinking liaison officer) that Gen. Lanrezac of the French Fifth Army had – ‘in a supremely uncoordinated move’ – broken off fighting and retreated, without telling the French Commander (Joffre) or the British to his immediate left, who were now alone, isolated and vulnerable. Sir John French withdrew and the ‘Retreat from Mons’ had begun (it continued until September 5th – Mons itself was only liberated, by the Canadian 3rd Div., on Nov. 11, 1918, the last day of the War). British casualties were 1600; German losses were 12-15,000, a tribute to the superb marksmanship of Britain’s small, professional army. Their rate of fire led the Germans to believe that ‘each English soldier was armed with his own Maxim’ (in fact, of course, there were only two Vickers-Maxim machine guns per battalion).

The Retreat from Mons

SAINT SYMPHORIEN CEMETARY (2 km on Route de Binche) is unique. Begun by the Germans immediately after the battle, its contours follow the slag heaps of an old potash mine. Both German and British (nearly 400) lie here. Many of the defenders of Obourg were buried in a mass grave, the Germans erecting a column in honour of the ‘Royal’ [sic] Middlesex Regiment. The cemetery also contains:

LIEUT. MAURICE DEASE V.C., the first VC of the War (see below)
PRIVATE J. PARR, of 4 Middx., the first British soldier killed in the War (on 21 or 22 August, on reconnaissance near Obourg)
PRIVATE J.L. PRICE, a Canadian of 3rd Div., killed while holding flowers given by grateful Belgians, at 1058 hours on November 11, 1918. He was the last soldier killed in the Great War
PRIVATE G.E. ELLISON, of 5th Royal Irish Lancers, the last British soldier to be killed, also on November 11.

THE FIRST AND LAST SHOTS MEMORIAL lies at Casteau on the Brussels road (Route 7, now N6), just past the crossroads with the old Route 370. Cpl. E. Thomas of 4th Royal Irish Dragoon Guards shot and hit an Uhlan (German cavalry) officer at 400 yards, having lain in ambush, on August 22 at around 0700. A cairn commemorates the event. And at this very spot an advanced post of 116th Canadian Infantry Battalion fired the last shots and welcomed the cease-fire, on November 11, 1918. A plaque across the road records the occasion.

At La Bascule E of Mons on the N90/N40 ‘Binche crossroads’ is a Celtic Cross commemorating the crucial stand here, until nightfall on 23 August, of RQMS Fitzpatrick DCM and 40 men of 2nd Royal Irish Regiment, which allowed the safe withdrawal of the BEF. Fitzpatrick and 18 men survived.

8 rooms on the ground floor of the War Museum (an unreconstructed museum of the ‘bung-it-all-in-a-case’ school) in the central square of Mons, by the Town Hall, are devoted to WWI and contain weapons and memorabilia, as well as a large famous painting of the ‘Angel of Mons’ legend – a nonsense invented by Arthur Machen of the London Evening News that bowmen ‘angels’ appeared in the sky over Mons on 23 Aug. and saved the British.

On Castle Hill behind the Town Hall is the17th C. Belfry Tower, at whose top is a panorama describing the battles of ’14 and ’18 (as well as ’40, ’44). In the surrounding gardens a good overview of the battlefield is visible to the N – at 12 o’clock is Nimy (4RF), and at 2 o’clock a cement factory marks the canal site defended by 4 Middx.

Mons: Nicky Bird showing how Dease and Godley won the first two VCs of the Great War on the railway bridge over the canal

Nimy Bridges: only between Nimy and Obourg does the canal follow its 1914 route. At Nimy (parking in Place de Nimy) the railway and road bridges (unblown in ’14 owing to lack of explosive) are replacements but look the same. An Irishman, Lt. Dease (4RF), the first VC of the War, fired his one remaining machine gun from the top of the embankment at the S end of the railway bridge; when Dease died of his many wounds Pt. Frank Godley, the second VC of the War, took over and held off the enemy for an hour while his comrades retreated towards Mons. He was wounded and captured, but not before he dismantled his gun and threw it into the canal.

Obourg Railway Station: on the centre platform, on an isolated wall, is a plaque commemorating the stand of 4th Middx. and the actions of an unknown British soldier who covered the Middx. retreat from the roof of a building which stood on this spot, until killed. Rapid fire and machine guns caused appalling casualties in the packed ranks of the six German assault battalions; but despite support from 2nd RIR the defenders were forced to withdraw after German co-ordinated artillery, machine gun and infantry attacks.

LE CATEAU

‘I don’t believe any of us at the time believed we were retiring…the officers were telling us that we were drawing the enemy into a trap.’ The reality was an exhausting retreat (the BEF preferred the word ‘retire’), particularly for Smith-Dorrien’s II Corps which had born the brunt of the fighting (Gen. Haig’s I Corps to his right had suffered very little at Mons). On the night of August 25th they staggered into Le Cateau, 50 km SW of Mons. Smith-Dorrien intended to resume the retreat next day, but Gen. Allenby (of the newly-arrived 4th Div., not part of II Corps, but agreeing to be under their command) told him that the high ground before the town that Allenby planned to hold to cover withdrawal was lost; and that the retreat should resume immediately, as the Germans would attack in the morning. The men, however, were shattered, the roads were impassable – either flooded by heavy storms or crammed with refugees. French had issued orders at 2100 on 25/8 for the withdrawal to continue on the 26th — which II Corps forwarded to all units — but contact with French’s HQ, back at St. Quentin, was now broken.

Smith-Dorrien decided to disobey French and countermand his previous orders; to stand and fight along the ridge outside the town (which the enemy entered at 0600 on the 26th) by the Roman road that runs NW to Cambrai (the scene of the first great tank attack by the British in 1917). The weakness of the position was the right flank, which made a rt. angle bend at Le Cateau, running back down the Selle valley. Smith-Dorrien hoped that Haig’s I Corps would cover this flank – to avoid enfilading fire – but Haig had no information or orders and continued to retire S. German III Corps began occupying this vital ground from early p.m.

5 British divisions and 230 guns faced over twice that number. As at Mons, rapid and accurate British small arms fire, very closely supported by field artillery (in the open, as at Waterloo – this was the last time targets were directly engaged on such a scale) held sway initially. But German superiority in firepower, particularly machine guns, took their toll on guns, gun teams and infantry in cut cornfields (there was only time to dig shallow trenches with ‘their wretched little tools’). They concentrated on the 5th Div. (Gen. Fergusson) area on the right (Le Cateau-Caudry). The centre, held by 3rd Div., remained steadfast. On the left, from Esnes to Ligny, Gen. Sordet’s Cavalry Corps – with its 75 mm guns – steadied the 4th Div., but the line, attacked by Marwitz Cav. Corps, was pushed back across Warnelle Ravine by early p.m., and the flank threatened.

On the right of the 5th Div. line, 2nd Suffolk and 2nd KOYLI — on an exposed spur — were being overwhelmed by artillery fire from 3 German Divs. and frontal attacks by 12 infantry battalions, bent on outflanking the British. II Corps was facing destruction.

Le Cateau: the rescue of two Howitzers by 37 (H) Battery in which 3 VCs were won

Smith-Dorrien issued orders – at 1340 — to withdraw by divs. from right to left, a hazardous ploy that could spell disaster. Although forward units only received orders at 1500 (by runner), the manoeuvre was eventually – and successfully — carried out, but much of the artillery was destroyed when the Germans spotted what was happening and rained down a lethal cannonade on the vulnerable retreating limbers. 3 VCs were won by men volunteering to return to the ridge and rescue 2 Howitzers. The Suffolks and KOYLI never received their orders to retire and were wiped out. But elsewhere a fighting disengagement was ‘executed with almost parade exactitude’. By 1700 the whole of II Corps was in retreat, in good order with flank guards established.

The Retreat continued, unharried for the moment by von Kluck, who had overestimated British strength and now failed to grasp that II Corps had retired due S. Smith-Dorrien had bought time. The nightmare of annihilation or rout was averted – at a cost of 8000 men and 38 precious guns (German losses were similar). He had delayed the German advance by half a day. French, who initially praised his stand, was later to vilify him for disobeying orders. Smith-Dorrien was sent home in 1915.

Wilfred Owen

LE CATEAU MILITARY CEMETERY (known as the ‘International Cemetery’ – British, German and Russian lie here) is W of Le Cateau on D932 just N of the crossroads with N43. There are 640 British burials, including that of Lnc. Cpl. John Sayer VC, killed on 21 March, 1918, the opening day of Ludendorf’s Spring offensive. On Aug. 26, 1914, this area was attacked, and eventually taken, by German 7th Div. From this spot German guns were moved up and you will see that the Br. 5th Div. positions to the S were clearly visible (held by 14th Brigade – 2nd Suffolks, 1st E. Surreys, 2nd Manchester, 1st DCLI, reinforced by 2nd ASH and 1st Middx. of 19th Brigade).

The exact spot on the Sambre/Oise Canal where Wilfred Owen was killed, 4/11/18

The Suffolk Memorial (2 km SW of Le Cateau – IGN map point 139) marks the centre of their position on high ground. (Reumont, where Fergusson commanded the 5th Div. is visible on a rise to the SW. And further to the W, a water tower marks Bertry, S-D’s HQ.) The Suffolks had started to withdraw early on the 26th when at 0600 they were stopped and told to stand. They had no choice of position – it is totally exposed – digging shallow trenches in the forward slope. Batteries of 15th Brig. RFA (Lt-Col. Stevens) were 200 yds. behind, just forward of reserve troops. A white water tower to the N marks the Int. Cemetery where German machine guns were sited, and where, slightly to your right, the initial attacks came just after 0600, moving to their left to outflank II Corps. Infantry attacks built up during the morning from ahead and to the right, discouraged by RFA (52nd Batt. – later all killed or captured — fired 1100 rounds), but the enemy were gradually filtering around the right rear, and at 1400 the guns – those few remaining – were withdrawn. The position was lost by 1600.

[CWG Cemetery at Ors (9km along Landrecies road, 2km N of bridge over Sambre Canal): two VCs – 2nd Lt. James Kirk and Lt-Col. James Neville – are buried here along with a fellow officer WILFRED OWEN – all three killed on November 4th, 1918, while attempting a crossing of the Sambre Canal. The inscription on Owen’s grave reads – ‘Shall life renew/ These bodies?/ Of a truth/ All death will he annul’. In Owen’s poem quoted, the second sentence also ended with a question mark. On the bridge over the canal in the centre of the village is a memorial to Owen.]

Wilfred Owen's grave (3rd from left) in Ors Communal Cemetery

Arbre Rond (‘Round Tree’ — IGN map point 138) is a solitary tree by a sunken track that runs W to Troisvilles from Le Cateau, a replacement for a lone 40ft. tree that stood on this spot in 1914. Some say it is the original. The Germans had the tree marked on their maps, and ranged their guns on it. 1st Norfolks of 15th Brig., manning this sector, wanted it cut down. Was it? On the track’s northern edge, just before its junction with the D932 St. Quentin road, stood the 6 guns of 122 Batt. RFA in the field, sheltered from frontal fire by rising ground. But soon the gun line was unsafe – the spire of St. Martin’s church in Le Cateau is visible, from where machine gun fire poured; as it did from the near lip of the cutting carrying the Cambrai road through a spur, above which stands the water tower.

LE CATEAU is a tiny battlefield. Wellington would have understood much about it. Lines of infantry, solid, disciplined, loyal to their comrades; brave leaders with regimental pride, gunners who would neither abandon their guns nor the infantry they supported, soldiers who about-turned ‘as on a parade ground’ and marched back to battle when ordered. And who did not flinch when cannonaded. ‘Le Cateau was the last battle of the old war.’

ITINERARY

DAY 1 Depart by EuroStar from WATERLOO (appropriately) around 16.30
Arrive BRUSSELS around 20.00. Drive in rented vehicle to HOTEL near Waterloo
DAY 2 Drive in rented vehicle to WATERLOO battlefield
DAY 3 To MONS and LE CATEAU
DAY 4 Depart BRUSSELS by EuroStar around 17.00
Arrive WATERLOO around 19.30